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This paper examines investment and livelihood decisions among forest peasant 
households in the Amazonian floodplain.  A dynamic household model of multiple asset 
accumulation and activity choice under risk and credit constraints is developed by 
incorporating natural resource use and human capital evolution.  Asset portfolios and 
sectoral incomes are estimated and then simulated to investigate the endowment and 
lifecycle dependency as well as the convergence/divergence of asset accumulation and 
corresponding activity choices.  Physical asset endowment (especially land) and different 
human capital evolutions across activities help to explain forest peasants’ livelihood 
choices, distinctive asset portfolios, and divergent income outcomes over the lifecycle. 
 
JEL classification: Q12; O13; O16; O54; J24  
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Economic activities of peasant households living in tropical rainforests (“forest 
peasant households”) include agriculture, fishing, aquatic extraction, hunting, timber and 
non-timber forest product gathering.  The specific mix of such activities pursued by forest 
peasants tends to be quite heterogeneous across communities, within communities, and 
within households over time (Anderson and Ioris, 1992; Coomes, 1996; Godoy et al., 
1995; Gunatilake et al., 1993; Padoch et al., 1999).  Developing a basic understanding of 
this heterogeneity in forest peasant livelihood strategies is essential in the on-going effort 
to  designing effective integrated conservation-development initiatives in valued 
rainforests around the world.  In the absence of such understanding, policies and 
programs tend to be rather general in both focus and approach (i.e., “one-size fits all”), 
and lack firm grounding in the basic logic of household decision-making (Coomes and 
Barham, 1997).  Using a unique data set gathered in 1996/97, this paper explores wealth 
accumulation and activity choice evolution among forest peasant households in Peru’s 
Pacaya-Samiria National Reserve (PSNR), one of the world’s richest zones of 
biodiversity and largest protected areas in the Amazonian floodplain.  
Our major hypothesis is that wealth holdings strongly shape livelihood choices 
among forest peasant households and explain livelihood heterogeneity in rain forest 
environments.  “Wealth” in our framework includes physical assets (i.e., land, productive 
and non-productive capital), non-physical assets (i.e., human and social capital), and 
natural capital (e.g., natural resource stock).  In biodiverse tropical rain forests, natural 
capital undoubtedly contributes to observed activity variations across communities, but 
significant inter-household variations in activity mix appear to exist even among 
  1households facing similar natural endowments (Coomes, 1996).  Using the same PSNR 
data, we have shown elsewhere that differences in extant physical wealth holdings do 
help to explain livelihood heterogeneity among forest peasant households (Barham et al., 
1999; Takasaki et al., 2001).  
This asset-dependency of activity choice is an informative but rather obvious 
finding, especially to economists.  A more critical question is how household asset 
portfolios evolve given differences in initial endowments, and whether there is evidence 
of endowment-dependency of asset accumulation.  If so, households starting with 
relatively poor endowments may be constrained in their ability to select a mix of 
activities and to accumulate assets in a way that will allow convergence with richer 
households.  Indeed, recent work by Zimmerman and Carter (1999) and Dercon (1998) 
find strong evidence of such constraints at work among African peasant households, 
respectively, in Burkina Faso, where only relatively asset-rich households accumulate 
high-risk, high-return land, and in Tanzania, where credit constraints restrict the ability of 
poorer households to make the lumpy investment into the high-risk, high-return activity 
of cattle raising.  Should endowment dependency also be evident among Amazonian 
forest peasant households – where rich biodiversity gives rise to multiple activity options 
– then additional and perhaps more compelling evidence would be available to suggest 
the broad applicability of the concept of endowment dependency across a wide range of 
natural environments.  
 Because forest peasant households face a broad set of choices in terms of 
resource use activity and asset accumulation, the paper extends standard agricultural 
household models by adding extractive capital and resource extraction options into the 
  2dynamic choice problems.  Along the Amazon floodplain, the recent adoption of modern 
fishing equipment has enabled rural households to engage in more commercially oriented 
fishing (Goulding et al., 1996; McGrath et al., 1993), and fishing capital has become an 
alternative asset to land (Takasaki et al., 2001).  Moreover, traditional skills and practices 
developed by indigenous forest peoples to extract highly valued resources are also 
important non-physical - or human capital - assets in Amazonia (e.g., Denevan and 
Padoch, 1987; Nepstad and Schwartzman, 1992; Redford and Padoch, 1992).  This paper 
considers the role of such extractive skills by evaluating heterogeneous human capital 
evolution as shaped both by training and/or family experience in traditional resource 
extraction and by changes that occur over the lifecycle with shifts in the physical 
capabilities of household members.  
Lifecycle effects are incorporated not only in the analysis of human capital 
evolution and the pursuit of extractive activities, but also with the other economic 
activities pursued by forest peasant households.  Specifically, we treat Chayanovian 
concerns about how peasant households needs and capabilities may shift over time and 
thus affect their resource allocation decisions in agriculture and fishing.  As such, the 
paper also attempts to address the extent to which activity choice and asset accumulation 
are also lifecycle-dependent, and whether this dependence affects the observed patterns of 
convergence or divergence in the evolution of asset portfolios and activity choices.  Both 
endowment-dependency and lifecycle-dependency may help to explain differential 
reliance among households on certain types of critical natural resources. 
The organization of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 introduces the relationship 
between wealth and activity choice among Amazonian peasant households by comparing 
  3current and initial asset holdings and relating them to current activity choice variations.  
Section 3 develops a stochastic dynamic programming model that formally captures the 
dynamics of multiple asset accumulation and activity choice.  Section 4 presents the 
econometric models used to estimate the system of asset accumulation and sectoral 
income relationships whose results in turn allow us to examine asset, endowment, and 
lifecycle dependencies.  Section 5 discusses the estimation results.  Section 6 simulates 
asset and income evolution paths of initially “poor” and “rich” households to explore 
tendencies toward convergence or divergence over the lifecycle.  Section 7 concludes.  
2.  Descriptive results of asset accumulation and activity choice  
 
The PSNR – situated in northeastern Peru – is a vast lowland region (more than 
two million hectares) dominated by inundated (swamp) forest with significant areas of 
seasonally flooded forest (Bayley et al., 1991; Rodríguez et al., 1995).  Residents are 
primarily mestizo peasants (locally known as ribereños) who rely on floodplain 
agriculture, fishing, and aquatic and terrestrial extraction for their livelihood (Coomes et 
al., 1996; Takasaki et al., 2001).  Forest peasants adapt to flood cycles by seasonally 
shifting resource use activities: generally, floodplain agriculture and fishing are 
productive during low water, whereas hunting and gathering become more productive 
during the high-water period when extractive access improves and agricultural options 
are limited.  The primary source of information used in this paper is socio-economic 
survey data gathered from 300 forest peasant households in eight villages in the PSNR 
area in 1996/97.
1   
                                                 
1 The eight villages were selected so as to capture the region’s diversity in economic activity and location.  
The sample was stratified to include most of the wealthy households, who were chosen on the basis of an 
initial Rapid Rural Appraisal that identified and ranked the wealth holdings of all households in the villages 
(Takasaki et al., 2000).  Respondent attrition during the extended study period and incomplete responses to 
  4As shown in Table 1, the mean household annual income for the sample is 4,223 
Peruvian soles (about US$1,624 in 1996/97).  Agriculture and fishing are the two major 
activities, each with nearly 40% income share.  The balance is accounted for by skilled 
and unskilled extractive activities.
2  Both subsistence crops (mainly manioc and plantain) 
and cash crops (rice, and to a lesser degree maize and cowpea) are cultivated.  Fishing 
involves a wide variety of equipment, from very rudimentary nets and canoes to larger 
boats, engines, and various types of synthetic fishing nets.  Skilled extraction entails the 
capture or gathering of aquatic and terrestrial resources using special skills, knowledge, 
and traditional equipment.  Examples include paiche fishing
3, aquarium fish gathering,  
and hunting (Coomes et al., 2001).  Unskilled extraction involves aquatic and terrestrial 
resources, collected with relatively limited skills, knowledge, and equipment,  such as 
shrimp, turtle and turtle eggs, palm hearts and fruit, and other non-timber forest products.  
Wage labor opportunities (included in Table 1 under unskilled extraction) are very 
limited, and mostly arise in the weeding and harvesting stages of agricultural production 
(especially in rice cropping).  Almost all households in the study region practice 
agriculture and fishing for subsistence and/or cash earnings; fewer households engage in 
extractive activities, primarily for cash earnings.  Unskilled extraction is considered to 
entail less risk than the agriculture, fishing or skilled extraction.     
                                                                                                                                                 
retrospective questions by some respondents reduced the sample size to 211 households for which complete 
data are available.      
2 Takasaki et al. (2000) offer more detailed descriptive analyses on households’ asset holdings and activity 
choice.  Total income values are not fully comprehensive, because cash-earnings from livestock sales, shop 
sales, trading, informal market-credit contract, and capital rental, and some subsistence forest product 
gathering (e.g., firewood, medicinal plants) are not included in income calculations.  That said, these 
additional income shares are likely to be much smaller than those of the productive activities covered here.  
Incomes of large productive capital owners may be overestimate because they do not include the 
transportation costs of product sales and extractive trips, and the provision and maintenance cost of fishing 
and hunting.  Also, household incomes in one upland village may be somewhat underestimated because our 
survey scheme failed to include production levels from some fruit crops on upland agroforestry holdings.   
  5Land and capital equipment – the main productive factors for agriculture and 
fishing, respectively – are expected to be key determinants of variations in activity 
choices across households (Takasaki et al., 2001).  Land is held in usufruct (with no title), 
privately used, and transferred principally along kin lines.  Land markets are absent; new 
land is obtained by clearing forests in this land-abundant environment.
4  Non-land assets 
consist of high-return, high-risk productive capital (mainly fishing capital), as well as 
low-return, low-risk non-productive capital, such as consumer durables, other houses, and 
livestock.  These assets are privately owned and are typically purchased outside of the 
village.   
Holdings of land and non-land assets can change significantly over the lifecycle 
of households, from initial endowments through to the current portfolio.  Indeed, in this 
paper, we are particularly interested in how initial endowments shape households’ 
investment decisions and wealth portfolios over time.  Initial evidence of asset portfolio 
evolution is found in Table 1 which compares the ‘average household’ between two sub-
samples, one called the “initial land-poor—capital poor”, and the other the “initial land-
rich—capital rich”.  Initial holdings are defined as those held by the household after its 
first year in the current village.
5  A household’s class assignment is based on whether its 
holdings are below or above the median for that wealth type.  Examining asset 
accumulation only in the current village avoids any confusion caused by the impacts of 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 Paiche (Arapaima gigas) is a premium species caught using traditional fishing techniques as well as 
modern large-mesh fishing nets.   
4 This paper does not consider different land types and agricultural strategies but rather aggregated land 
holdings and agricultural activity in order to focus on broader asset portfolio issues (such as land versus 
non-land assets) and activity choice (agriculture versus fishing versus extraction).        
5 Initial asset holdings are constructed based on lifecycle history data.  The current median value of each 
non-land asset item is used to construct monetary measures of initial non-land asset holdings.  With no data 
on relative price of non-land asset items over time, we do not adjust values in different years.      
  6changes in the endowments of local environments.  Mean tests assess whether the sub-
sample characteristics are similar to those of remaining observations in the sample.   
The results in Table 1 should be viewed with two cautions in mind.  First, Table 1 
provides an aggregated picture of households from all eight villages where natural 
endowments differ markedly and household distributions across wealth classes are 
unbalanced.  Second, households in the poor (rich) class are significantly younger (older) 
than the remaining households.  Thus, different asset holding patterns may be explained 
by village factors and/or lifecycle effects, which we control for later in the econometric 
analysis. 
As shown in Table 1, significant differences between wealth classes in current 
asset holdings coincide closely with differences in households’ initial holdings, though 
the degree of inequality declines over the lifecycle, especially in non-land asset holdings.  
Initial endowments not only influence the level of current holdings and incomes but also 
appear to shape the composition of current asset portfolios.  Note that the “poor” 
currently hold proportionally more productive capital among their non-land assets than 
do the “rich”, and that the current asset portfolio of the “poor” is more productive-capital-
oriented, whereas the portfolio of the “rich” is more land-oriented (Table 1).  Such 
differences in asset composition are associated with differences in livelihood activity: the 
“poor” rely more on fishing and less on agriculture; the “rich” rely more on agriculture 
and less on fishing.  Poorer households’ greater reliance on productive capital and fishing 
may be a response to constraints they face in accumulating land; ready access to rich 
fishing areas may also offset their demand for land.  Lastly, limited differences in labor 
  7endowments between ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ households suggest that major activity variations 
are unlikely to be significantly explained by differential labor supply. 
3.  A model of asset accumulation and activity choice 
Following Dercon (1998), this section develops a dynamic model of asset 
accumulation and activity choice under risk and credit constraints.  Households allocate 
labor to different activities and invest in a variety of assets.  The model shows that under 
credit constraints, initial asset holdings determine subsequent asset accumulation, labor 
allocation, and income generation.   
One distinctive feature of this model is our incorporation of multiple natural 
resource use options that are available to rain forest peasant households.  Most natural 
resources in the PSNR are open access.
6  Production technologies of land clearing, 
fishing, and extraction involve extractive effort and resource stock as key production 
factors.  Under an open access regime, no feedback of resource use decisions on stocks is 
considered by individual households (i.e., there is stock externality).   
With a highly abundant resource stock, households naturally assume that the 
potential flow of services from resource stock is stationary over time; in a stochastic 
environment, households anticipate the expected flow of services based on information 
available at the current period.  These conditions appear to predominate in the stochastic, 
biodiverse riverine environment of the PSNR.  First, large-scale deforestation is not 
occurring, nor is it foreseen in this protected area with moderate population growth (i.e., 
land is still abundant regionally, and only about 1% of the PSNR is cleared for 
                                                 
6 Where communal labor is used for land clearing, as discussed below, forest land destined for agriculture 
should be considered as a common property resource.  In our modeling, however, we treat forest land as an 
open access resource, because the communal labor group size in the community tends to be large enough 
  8agricultural purposes).  Second, in the Amazonian floodplain, fish are also abundant 
except for certain premium species (Bayley and Petrere, 1989).  Third, stocks of fish, 
other aquatic species, and wildlife stocks are strongly affected by the stochastic flood 
regimes.  Therefore, households are modeled as treating the potential flow of services 
from resource stocks as exogenous and stationary.   
There are five activities to which labor can be allocated in each year t.  The gross 




i is exogenous output price and Y
i
t is a well-
behaved production technology.  The profit function of activity i is defined as F
i
t.  
Natural resource stocks do not appear in production functions for brevity.  The model 
considers only yield risk, which can be incorporated in each risky production technology 
(i.e., agriculture, fishing, skilled extraction).  Rental, insurance, credit, and land markets 
are absent though the model assumes the existence of a labor market for agriculture.   
The first activity specified is agriculture.  At the beginning of the agricultural 
season (i.e., the low-water period), households have two options; the first is to cultivate 
the same field as in the previous year, and the second is to clear open-access forest to add 
a field.  Land clearing is done by communal work, which is assumed to be perfectly 
mutual in the same year; the household works for others just as much as the help they 
receive.  Household labor allocation to land clearing, L
c
t, is thus equivalent to the total 
labor input for land clearing.  The quantity and quality of land change over time under 
stochastic flood regimes.  Land evolution is given by:  
At+1 = t(At + Gt(L
c
t))                       ( 1 )  
                                                                                                                                                 
for us to ignore strategic interaction among households.  Put differently, the model treats forest land as an 
unregulated common property resource (Baland and Platteau, 1996).            
  9where At is land available at the beginning of time t, Gt(L
c
t) is a well-behaved forest 
clearing technology before cultivation in time t,
7 and t is a stochastic factor with mean 1 
and constant variance during the high-water period after cultivation in time t .  Fallow 
decisions are not modeled here for simplicity.  Agricultural production technology is 
assumed to involve labor and land as the production factors.  No purchased inputs, 
farming equipment, or animal plowing are used.  In addition to own labor, L
a
t, labor can 
be hired in at fixed wage w per unit of labor, but hired labor, L
h
t, requires supervision 
time, M(L
h
t), with M(0)=0 and M’(L
h















t                 (2) 
The second risky activity is fishing.  Fishing capital, Kt, accumulates by 
investments, It, at the end of time t which are purchased outside of the village.  
Investments are assumed to be perfectly sunk because of the prohibitively high 
transaction costs for resale in this remote environment: i.e.,  
It0                         ( 3 )  
With depreciation at the rate of 
k (0<
k<1), the evolution of fishing capital follows:
  
Kt+1 = (1-
k)Kt + It                       ( 4 )  
Labor, L
f
t, and fishing capital, Kt, are assumed to be the production factors.  A cost 
function, Q(Kt) with Q(0)=0 and Q’(Kt)>0 is assumed.  Rather than modeling share or 
team fishing, we assume self-sufficiency of owned labor.  We also abstract from capital 
rental, although such an extension is straightforward as suggested by Dercon (1998, p19, 
f27).  Consequently, the net return for fishing is:  
                                                 








t, Kt) – Q(Kt)                     (5) 
Skilled extraction is the last risky activity.  Specific extractive skills, Ht, are an 
important input in the skilled extraction technology in addition to labor, L
s
t.  Skills 
available at the beginning of time t equals the sum of depreciated accumulated skills from 
the beginning of the previous period and any newly acquired skills during the previous 
period.  Skill level depreciates at the rate of 
h (0<
h<1), if the household is not active in 
skilled extraction because of ever-changing environmental conditions  The household can 
acquire new skills or mitigate skill depreciation by learning-by-doing through 
participation in the activity.
8  Again, we assume a well-behaved skill acquisition function, 
Dt(L
s




t)<0.  Consequently, the evolution of 




t)                     (6) 








t, Ht)                       ( 7 )  
The fourth and fifth activities are unskilled extraction and agricultural wage labor, 




t, respectively, as 













t                        ( 9 )  
Given fixed total available labor endowments, L, the labor time constraint and the 
usual non-negativity constraints on labor allocation are given by:    
                                                 
8 Another factor that shapes skill evolution is age of household members or household head, because the 
depreciation of skill holdings and the productivity of skill acquisition can vary over the lifecycle.  Such 
lifecycle factors are not explicitly modeled here, but are explored in the econometric analysis.  See 














t               (10) 
L
i
t0 (i = a, f, s, u, w, h, c)                        (11a-g)  
In addition to land and fishing capital, households own a variety of non-
productive capital, Zt, which we assume is to be held in non-negative amounts, yielding a 
low but constant return of r.  This capital is assumed to be perfectly liquid, and thus serve 
both as a buffer against consumption shocks and as a temporary store of wealth for future 
investment.  Non-productive capital can be accumulated (depleted) by saving (withdraw), 
Rt, at the end of time t.  A credit constraint is thus given by:   
Rt (1+r)Zt                    (12)   
and non-productive capital evolution follows: 
Zt+1 = (1+r)Zt + Rt                   (13) 
Using (2), (5), (7), (8), (9) and defining Ct as consumption at time t and pk and pz 
as time-constant fishing equipment and saving unit prices, respectively, with consumer 






























t  Ct + p
kIt + p
zRt            (14) 
The household is assumed to solve the following stochastic dynamic 
programming problem subject to four state equations (1), (4), (6) and (13) and the inter-
temporal budget constraint (14), by choosing ten control variables, consumption, saving, 
capital investment, labor allocations to land clearings, agriculture, fishing, skilled 
extraction, unskilled extraction and wage labor, and hired labor: 
Max u(Ct) + V(At+1, Kt+1, Ht+1, Zt+1) + tp
z(Rt +(1+r)Zt) + 	tp
kIt  
                                                                                                                                                 
Pattanayak and Sills (1999) for a similar conceptual argument on the learning-by-doing nature of human 












































t           (15) 
where  is a discount factor; u() is a well-behaved instantaneous utility function; V() is a 
value function; and t, 	t, 
t, and 
i
t, where i = a, f, s, u, w, h, c, are Lagrangean 
multipliers for constraints, (12), (3), (10), and (11a-g), respectively.  Labor has to be 
allocated before the earnings for the current year can be known, and actual consumption,  
saving, and productive capital investment will be determined after the uncertainty is 
resolved.  It is further assumed that u’(Ct) becomes infinite if Ct approaches minimum 
consumption (Zeldes, 1989).  Given an initial asset portfolio in the first year, a solution 
can be found by solving a standard stochastic dynamic program.
9   
The first order conditions define the optimal consumption-saving choice, portfolio 
choice between productive and non-productive capital, and labor allocations.  These are 
not discussed here, as most of them are similar to those derived by Dercon (1998).  One 
distinctive implication from this model is that a complete optimal asset portfolio choice is 
given by combining the optimal portfolio choice and labor allocation conditions.  This 
arises because the marginal returns to land clearing and skilled extraction labor consist of 
not only the direct returns in the current year but also their contributions in the future 
years through land and skill accumulations.  The model suggests that: (1) the household’s 
asset holdings at the beginning of time t, Wt = (At, Kt, Zt, Ht), are determined by initial 
asset holdings at time 0, W0, labor endowments, L, duration of accumulation, t, and shock 
                                                                                                                                                 
capital for extractive activities in the Amazon rain forest. 
9 With the continuity of the objective function, a closed and bounded feasible set is sufficient to guarantee 
the existence of a solution to the problem.     
  13history, {t}; and (2) household resource allocations at time t are determined by the asset 
holdings at time t, Wt, and labor endowments, L.  
4.  An econometric model of asset portfolio and sectoral income estimation  











t), the following sections explore two empirical 
implications of the model – endowment-dependency and lifecycle-dependency of asset 
accumulation – while confirming a third – asset-dependency of activity choice.  Given 
limited data on labor allocation, we cannot directly estimate labor allocation decisions, 
and redefine: (1) the asset set as Wt=(At, Kt, Zt), where extractive skills, Ht, are used only 











t includes both unskilled extraction and wage labor income as in Table 1.   
The theoretical model presented in Section 3 suggests an econometric model, with 
the following three sets of equations: 
Ft*   =   Wtt     + Xtt    + ut             (16) 
Wt   =   W0t0     + Xt0t0   + ut0             (17) 
















t>0, = 0 otherwise,  
where i = s, u, and N is the number of observations; Wt=(At, Kt, Zt) and W0=(A0, K0, Z0) 
are N




J0 matrices of exogenous variables, where J is the number of exogenous variables 










  14matrices of error terms; and notations of each asset and income variable follow the 
theoretical model above.   
A censored regression specification is necessary for the skilled and unskilled 
extraction income regressions, because many households do not participate in these 
activities.  Assuming the normal distribution of the 3rd and 4th columns of matrix ut, we 
employ a standard Tobit model.  The normality test for Tobit proposed by Pagan and 
Vella (P-V) (1989) is conducted to examine the validity of the distributional 
assumption.
10  Normality is crucial for the Tobit model, because if the underlying error 
structure is not normally distributed, the usual Tobit estimator is not consistent. 
The first set of equations (16) estimates sectoral income at time t using asset 
holdings at the beginning of time t as an endogenous variable, which are estimated in the 
second set of equations (17), using asset holdings at time 0 as endogenous variables.  The 
third set of equations (18) estimates asset holdings at time 0.  The endogenous variables 
and error terms in equation (16) and (17) may be correlated, because income generation 
and asset accumulation outcomes can both depend on the same unobservable cross-
sectional factors, such as farming skills, ability, and location (field)-specific micro 
conditions.  If either (or both) of these endogeneities exist, single-equation Least Squares 
(LS) and Tobit estimates of (16) and single-equation LS estimates of (17) will not be 
consistent; consequently, we must estimate simultaneous linear and Tobit equations, (16) 
and (17), simultaneous linear equations, (17) and (18), or simultaneous equations of (16)-
(18).  Smith and Blundell (S-B) (1986) provide an asymptotically efficient test for 
                                                 
10 The P-V normality test tests the null-hypothesis that the third and fourth moments of error terms are 0 
and 3
2, where 
2 is a variance of error terms.       
  15exogeneity for this type of Tobit simultaneous equations, and an exogeneity test for the 
simultaneous linear equations is provided by Wu (1973).   
A third specification issue in the regressions is that of heteroskedasticity.  We 
conduct two Lagrange multiplier tests to examine heteroskedasticity assuming 
multiplicative forms: a standard Breusch-Pagan (B-P) test and its Tobit-version (Greene, 
1993, pp698-700).  Heteroskedasticity in the Tobit model is especially problematic 
because, if present, the standard Tobit estimator is not consistent. 
The choice of exogenous variables follows the theoretical model closely.  In all 
regressions, eight village dummy variables are included as intercept shifters to capture 
across-village variations.  For the asset portfolio regressions, the exogenous variables 
include initial extractive skills, current labor supply, duration of accumulation, and shock 
factors.  Initial extractive skills are captured using one proxy variable defined as the 
average of original and current extractive skills (discussed below in notes 12 and 14).  
Current labor supply includes the number of male and female adults in the household.  
Kinship group size is also included to capture the potential for communal labor access for 
land clearing (Coomes and Burt, 1997).  Duration of accumulation is the number of years 
that the household has resided in the current village, and is essentially a lifecycle measure.  
Flood shock factors are captured by two dummies for prior experience with river bank 
slumping and high floods.  A dummy variable for former credit receipts (mainly through 
Agrarian Bank which was liquidated in 1992) is included.  The square of the lifecycle age 
and its linear interaction terms with each initial asset are also included.   
Exogenous variables for the initial asset estimation (18) are chosen treating time 0 
as the current period and some previous (or original) time 00 as the initial period in the 
  16theoretical model.
11  B-P heteroskedasticity tests are conducted by estimating the log of 
variances with initial holdings of the same asset, duration in the current village, and 
selected village dummy variable as explanatory variables.
12        
Exogenous variables for sectoral income estimation (16) consist of current 
extractive skills and current labor supply.  The current extractive skills are captured by a 
dummy variable that represents whether skilled extraction has been a major activity of 
household head over his/her lifecycle.
13  Labor supply variables are the same as those in 
the asset portfolio regressions, with the addition of the current age of household head to 
capture broad lifecycle effects on income generation.  The square of each of the three 
asset variables, labor supply variables, and lifecycle age variable are also included.  
Finally, village interaction terms with productive capital and its square are included for 
the fishing income regression to capture the distinctive fishing practices in one fishing-
oriented village.  Heteroskedasticity tests are conducted by estimating the log of 
variances with the main productive factors and selected village dummy variables as 
explanatory variables.   
5.  Asset portfolio and sectoral income estimation results 
The results of the Wu exogeneity test and B-P heteroskedasticity test of current 
asset portfolio regressions, or equations (17), are reported in Table 2.  The exogeneity 
tests show no signs of endogeneity with respect to each of three initial assets for each of 
                                                 
11 Original extractive skills are captured using a dummy variable that represents whether skilled extraction 
was a major activity of the parents of the household head when he (or she) was living with them.     
12 We use the dummy for Village 2 for the productive capital regression.  Use of large fishing nets based on 
work sharing is much more common in this village than in the other seven villages. 
13 Given limited data on historical activity, this variable considers only two major skilled extraction 
activities: paiche fishing and hunting.  This variable takes the value of .5 and 1, respectively, if either 
paiche fishing or hunting and both paiche fishing and hunting have been a major activity of household head 
over his/her lifecycle.  Original skills defined above also capture these two skilled extraction activities.  It 
  17the three regressions.  B-P tests strongly reject the null-hypothesis of homoskedasticity 
for all three regressions.  All estimated coefficients of explanatory variables for the 
heteroskedastic form have expected positive signs and are statistically significant.  
Generalized least square (GLS) specification assuming multiplicative heteroskedasticity 
and no endogeneity with initial assets is judged to be acceptable.   
Table 2 shows the GLS estimation results.  Initial land and non-productive capital 
holdings have a positive and statistically significant effect on the current holdings of the 
same assets, while initial productive capital holdings are positive but not significant.  
There exist very limited significant cross-asset relationships between initial and current 
holdings.  Duration of the household in the current village has statistically significant 
concave relationships with all three current assets.  That is, asset accumulation paths are 
consistent with the Chayanovian notion of lifecycle stages found in other studies of 
peasant land accumulation (e.g., Barham et al., 1995).  These econometric results suggest 
that initial endowment and lifecycle factors shape the evolution of asset portfolios.   
Table 3 reports the results of P-V normality test, Wu and S-B exogeneity tests, 
and heteroskedasticity tests of current sectoral income regressions, or equations (16).  
The P-V normality tests for skilled and unskilled extractions failed to reject the normality 
of the error terms.  The results of exogeneity tests show no signs of endogeneity with 
respect to each of three current assets for each of four regressions.  Heteroskedasticity 
tests reject the null-hypothesis of homoskedasticity for all four regressions.  All estimated 
coefficients of explanatory variables for the heteroskedastic form have expected signs 
                                                                                                                                                 
should be emphasized that the current extractive skills as well as the original skills are constructed based on 
lifecycle history data instead of current production data to avoid obvious endogeneity problems.              
  18and most are statistically significant.  Thus, GLS or Tobit specification assuming 
multiplicative heteroskedasticity and no endogeneity with current assets are employed.   
Table 3 shows the GLS and Tobit estimation results.  Current land holdings have 
a positive and statistically significant effect on agricultural income, and productive 
capital holdings have positive and statistically significant effects with decreasing 
marginal productivity on fishing and skilled extraction income.  These results strongly 
confirm the expected asset-activity dependency relationship portrayed earlier in Table 1.  
Land has a convex relationship with respect to unskilled extraction income, with the 
minimum attained at about 8 ha.  In general, as households accumulate land, they come to 
rely less on low-risk activities, but some larger land holders also pursue these activities.
14   
All skill coefficient estimates are positive and have relatively large magnitudes – 
the estimate for skilled extraction income is strongly significant.  These estimates not 
only confirm that extractive skills are a key production factor in skilled extraction, but 
also that extractive skills may be correlated with skills for other activities which were not 
formally modeled.  In other words, this skill variable may be a proxy for a larger base of 
productive local environmental knowledge and skills. 
Lifecycle coefficient estimates are consistently concave with the estimate for 
skilled extraction income being significant.  The three non-agricultural income sources 
peak early in the lifecycle (late 30s), whereas agricultural income is strictly increasing 
over the lifecycle.  The early peaks of skilled and unskilled extraction income suggest 
that young households allocate more labor to extraction as a transitory strategy for 
income generation, and that older households are less likely to rely on these activities 
                                                 
14 Indeed, Coomes et al. (1999) reveal that a few larger, older, and wealthier households are among the 
leading extractors of certain (low-skill) non-timber forest products and discuss the underlying logic. 
  19because of skill depreciation and/or improved opportunities in other activities.  These 
findings may portray a stark contrast in the evolution of skill between agriculture and 
non-agricultural activities, and suggest that even young households that are fishing-
oriented come to rely more on agriculture later in life.     
6.  Simulated evolution paths of asset portfolio and sectoral income  
This section uses the parameter estimates and the mean value of explanatory 
variables in Section 5 to simulate the asset accumulation and activity mix paths over the 
lifecycle for two hypothetical households, one “poor” and the other “rich” in initial 
endowments.  Specifically, the evolution of predicted asset holdings of land, productive 
capital, and non-productive capital are generated first by using the regression parameters 
(Table 2) and the mean initial endowment holdings of land-poor—capital-poor and land-
rich—capital rich households (Table 1).  By then changing the duration variable and the 
corresponding household head’s age, using the mean duration in the current village and 
current household head’s age of the “poor” and “rich” (Table 1), we simulate the path of 
asset holdings over time.  Incomes from agriculture, fishing, and both skilled and 
unskilled extractions are then generated using the predicted asset holdings in each period, 
the corresponding head of household’s age, and the regression parameters from Table 3.
15  
These lifecycle paths provide further evidence on the extent of endowment and lifecycle 
dependence as well as a means for examining whether convergence or divergence is 
occurring in the mix and levels of assets and incomes across different households.   
Figures 1 and 2 clearly demonstrate the distinctive role of initial endowments 
across assets over the lifecycle.  Although initial holdings of productive capital are more 
  20equal between the two groups than those of land and non-productive capital, relative 
inequality of productive capital significantly increases with the age of the household head 
whereas inequality of land and non-productive capital gradually decline.  For example, 
initially (i.e., at age 31), the ratio of the holdings of productive capital by the “rich” 
versus the “poor” households is 1.1, but by age 55, this same ratio is 1.9.  By contrast, 
similar ratios of land and non-productive capital holdings decline from 2.7 and 3.9, 
respectively, to 2.5 and 3.2.  These findings are consistent with the different degree of 
endowment-dependency across assets mentioned above.  Such findings also reflect 
differential risk-return calculations by households over investment decisions such that 
“rich” households are more likely to hold more risk-filled wealth portfolios.  
For both types of households, the paths of agricultural income evolution are 
increasingly concave in form and correspond closely to the paths of land evolution, thus 
supporting the asset-dependency proposition.  In contrast, the paths of fishing income 
evolution follow surprisingly similar trajectories (flat) despite the distinct productive 
capital accumulation paths.  “Rich” households, it seems, tend to accumulate 
transportation capital (e.g., boats and engines to transport their agricultural produce) 
rather than that for fishing as they accumulate land and expand agricultural production 
(Takasaki et al., 2001).  Skilled extraction incomes follow similar concave paths, with the 
maximum attained in the early 40s, followed by a dropping off to low levels (relative to 
other income sources) later in life.  Finally, the paths of unskilled extraction income are 
almost flat over the entire lifecycle, suggesting the persistent role of this low-risk activity 
over the lifecycle.  Overall, both “rich” and “poor” households take part more actively in 
                                                                                                                                                 
15 All other explanatory variables besides initial asset holdings, duration in the current village, and age of 
household head are assumed the same between the two groups, which allows us to focus exclusively on the 
  21extractive activities when they are young.  The predicted activity shift from extraction to 
agriculture appears to be caused by a transition from human to physical capital in the 
household asset portfolio corresponding to the lifecycle-dependency of asset 
accumulation.    
In absolute terms, divergence is clearly evident in the physical wealth holdings of  
“poor” and “rich” households, with the land holding gap growing from about 2.5 to 3.7 
hectares and the non-land asset gap increasing by a much greater proportion.  Some 
evidence is found, however, of convergence in the mix of asset holdings as both 
households accumulate non-land assets more proportionally than they do land.  Thus, 
early in the lifecycle, the asset portfolio of the “poor” household is relatively less land-
oriented, but it becomes as much land-oriented as that of the “rich” household later in the 
lifecycle (for example, the ratio of the non-land holdings versus the land holdings at age 
55 is 5.5 and 5.3, respectively, for the “poor” and “rich”).  Together, these observations 
suggest the presence of natural constraints on land accumulation.    
Absolute divergence in asset holdings is also reflected in a rising income gap over 
the household lifecycle.  Initially, total incomes are relatively similar, with the “rich” 
earning about 16% more (at age 31).  Overtime, the absolute incomes of both households 
rise, though by age 55, the “rich” earn about 25% more than the “poor” due to stronger 
growth among “rich” households in agricultural income.   In terms of activity mix, 
divergence occurs initially, as “poor” households rely more on fishing.  Over time, both 
types of households move toward an increased reliance on agriculture and a declining 
reliance on other activities.  Activity choice shifts from fishing to mixed for the “poor” 
                                                                                                                                                 
effects of endowments and lifecycle on wealth and activity choices. 
  22and from mixed to agriculture for the “rich”, so that over the lifecycle there is no clear 
sign of convergence or divergence in activity mix between the two groups.   
7. Conclusions 
In a wide variety of contexts, development economists have attempted to better 
understand the extent to which asset accumulation is endowment dependent.  At the core 
of these explorations is an underlying concern whether poorer households can “catch-up” 
by moving toward a more optimal mix of activities and returns, and/or by closing the 
income and wealth gap with respect to richer households.  This paper connects these 
development issues with natural resource use concerns, and examines them in a 
distinctive context – that of lowland Amazonia – where high environmental heterogeneity 
and rich biological diversity provide forest peasant households with a broad suite of 
livelihood activity options (i.e., agriculture, fishing, skilled and unskilled extractions) 
under highly stochastic biophysical conditions.  A unique data set was employed on 
wealth accumulation and life history gathered from forest peasant households who reside 
in one of Latin America’s most important protected areas, the Pacaya-Samiria National 
Reserve in Peru.    
The core findings of this paper are that: (1) agriculture, fishing, and skilled 
extraction are physical-asset dependent, and skilled extraction is also human-capital 
dependent; (2) land and non-productive capital accumulation are endowment-dependent 
though the accumulation of productive capital is not particularly endowment-dependent; 
(3) non-agricultural activities such as resource extraction (and probably related skills) 
peak earlier than agriculture and thus household activity choice shifts toward agriculture 
over the lifecycle; (4) in relative terms, convergence occurs during later years in the asset 
  23portfolio of “poor” and “rich” households, but absolute divergence appears to arise in 
asset holdings and income; and, (5) the strong endowment-dependence of land 
accumulation and agricultural earnings probably underlie the tendencies toward 
divergence revealed by our analyses.   
Basically, initially “poor” households cannot pursue the mix of activities that 
would be optimal because of constraints posed by their limited land endowments.  
Fishing and extraction offer reasonable alternatives in the earlier years of the family 
lifecycle, and allow them to achieve income levels that are fairly similar to “rich” 
households.  Indeed, access to resource rich locales may limit their initial need for land.  
But over time, the gap in terms of both income and asset outcomes grows, because 
declining human capital for non-agricultural activities forces “poor” households to 
explore agricultural opportunities which are constrained by their limited land 
endowments and by relatively modest accumulation of land in the earlier years.  This 
endowment-dependency of physical asset accumulation is consistent with the work of 
others (e.g., Dercon, 1998; Zimmerman and Carter, 1999), but it is more conclusively 
shown here by incorporating the lifecycle-dependency of human capital accumulation, 
based in part on retrospective data on initial conditions, and the modeling and 
econometric frameworks deployed.  Given that the range of available resource-based 
economic options is considerably greater in this environment, endowment-dependency 
results such as those presented here are even more compelling in terms of their potential 
applicability in other locales. 
Our paper also makes several methodological contributions that may assist 
researchers interested in modeling the accumulation of multiple assets and associated 
  24activity choices in rural developing areas.  First, our model incorporates a simple version 
of stochastic land evolution under flood regimes, which gives explicit treatment to the 
household decision to clear forest as a labor investment in land.  This approach promises 
to contribute to improving extant models of traditional agricultural decisions.  Second, a 
dynamic stochastic framework of multiple asset accumulation is developed, which then 
provides a bridge between peasant household theory and econometric modeling of 
resource use decisions, both in terms of variable choice and the system of equations that 
are estimated.  Third, the econometric specification is formally tested with respect to 
endogeneity, heteroskedasticity, and normality.  Such testing is important not only 
because it helps to ensure the consistency of the estimates derived here, but also because 
although researchers working on rural development are increasingly employing Tobit 
models for their empirical analysis, relatively few tend to undertake formal examination 
of the specifications.  The recent development of a variety of specification tests for Tobit 
models make such omissions less excusable.  Finally, the simulated asset and income 
evolution paths presented in this paper offer revealing portrayals of the factors underlying 
distinctive patterns of natural resource use behavior by forest peasant households.  
Further refinements of the stochastic dynamic programming framework along with 
additional econometric work to estimate key parameters should allow us to examine a 
wide range of conservation and development initiatives for their potential efficacy in 
shaping resource use decisions by peasant households in areas of rich biodiversity.   
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Household asset holdings, labor supply, and sectoral incomes for the initial wealth endowments  
All Initial land-poor Initial land-rich
Capital-poor Capital-rich
Mean Std dev Mean t statistic Mean t statistic
Initial asset holdings
    Land (ha) 2.4 (2.8) 0.6 -10 *** 4.8 6.6 ***
    Productive capital (S/.) 457 (1088) 47 -5.6 *** 823 2.8 ***
    Non-productive capital (S/.) 436 (1531) 33 -3.9 *** 1139 2.8 ***
Current asset holdings
    Land (ha) 3.4 (3.9) 1.2 -7.5 *** 6.5 7.2 ***
    Productive capital (S/.) 786 (1395) 510 -2.4 ** 1110 2.4 **
    Non-productive capital (S/.) 723 (1886) 241 -3.7 *** 1307 2.4 **
Labor supply
    No. male adults 1.9 (1.2) 1.8 -1.5 2.1 0.8
    No. female adults 1.7 (1.2) 1.5 -1.7 * 1.7 0.4
    Duration in the current village (year) 16 (13) 13 -2.7 *** 19 1.9 *
    Age of household head (year) 44 (14) 39 -3.6 *** 50 4.3 ***
Income (S/.)
    Agriculture 1677 (1955) 949 -4.8 *** 3118 5.4 ***
    Fishing 1642 (2203) 2071 1.6 1058 -3.1 ***
    Skilled extraction 490 (1053) 416 -0.7 610 0.9
    Unskilled extraction 415 (687) 382 -0.5 490 0.9
        Total income 4223 (2847) 3817 -1.3 5277 3.4 ***
No. observations 211 62 59
Note - Mean tests examine the null hypothesis that the mean of each sub-sample is the same as 
the remaining observations in the sample.  US$1=S/.2.6.  
*: significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***: significant at 1%.
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Current household asset portfolios
E(x) Land (ha) Productive capital Non-productive capital
GLS (100S/.)   GLS (100S/.)   GLS
Initial land (ha) 2.4 0.60 (0.13) *** 0.50 (0.32) 0.15 (0.62)
Initial land * Duration in the current village 42 0.0075 (0.01) 0.0021 (0.03) 0.0196 (0.04)
Initial productive capital (100S/.) 4.6 0.03 (0.02) 0.20 (0.14) -0.07 (0.17)
Initial productive capital * Duration in the current village 76 -0.0010 (0.00) -0.0012 (0.01) 0.0038 (0.01)
Initial non-productive capital (100S/.) 4.4 0.03 (0.02) -0.10 (0.08) 0.84 (0.36) **
Initial non-productive capital * Duration in the current village 72 0.00001 (0.002) 0.0121 (0.01) ** 0.0013 (0.02)
Initial extractive skills (0,.25,.5,.75,1=high) 0.09 -0.47 (0.90) 0.39 (2.87) 0.23 (5.06)
No. male adults 1.9 0.23 (0.20) 1.23 (0.62) ** 0.91 (1.08)
No. female adults 1.7 -0.25 (0.19) 0.08 (0.60) 0.57 (1.04)
Kinship group size (household) 7.8 0.00 (0.04) -0.01 (0.11) -0.15 (0.21)
Credit receipt experience (0=no, 1=yes) 0.46 0.40 (0.44) 1.38 (1.45) -1.28 (2.50)
River bank slump experience (0=no, 1=yes) 0.19 0.56 (0.56) -0.63 (1.78) -3.42 (3.10)
High flood experience (0=no, 1=yes) 0.55 0.97 (0.39) ** -0.01 (1.29) 1.09 (2.20)
Duration in the current village (year) 16 0.12 (0.06) ** 0.44 (0.19) ** 0.66 (0.34) *
Duration in the current village
2 433 -0.003 (0.001) * -0.010 (0.004) ** -0.015 (0.01) **
Village dummy 1 0.09 -1.14 (0.70) -2.79 (2.19) -2.79 (3.92)
Village dummy 2 0.07 -1.19 (0.58) ** 7.50 (9.7) -1.74 (3.52)
Village dummy 3 0.11 0.05 (0.66) -1.96 (2.02) -3.13 (3.65)
Village dummy 4 0.26 0.75 (0.62) -2.80 (1.98) -0.94 (3.54)
Village dummy 5 0.25 -1.10 (0.58) * 1.57 (1.88) -1.01 (3.45)
Village dummy 6 0.09 -0.07 (0.69) -3.79 (2.25) * -5.43 (4.05)
Village dummy 7 0.05 -0.67 (0.77) 1.16 (2.61) -0.59 (4.47)
Village dummy 8 0.09 0.79 (0.68) -2.03 (2.05) -3.16 (3.75)
Wu exogeneity test (F(2,186))
    Initial land (ha) 1.20 0.27 0.89
    Initial productive capital (100S/.) 1.20 0.22 1.07
    Initial non-productive capital (100S/.) 2.19 0.03 0.52






(2)) 36 *** 532 *** 143 ***
Heteroskedastic form
    Constant -0.67 (0.25) *** 1.28 (0.27) *** 1.53 (0.27) ***
    Initial land (ha) 0.10 (0.05) **
    Initial productive capital (100S/.) 0.04 (0.01) **
    Initial non-productive capital (100S/.) 0.05 (0.01) ***
    Duration in the current village (year) 0.05 (0.01) *** 0.05 (0.01) *** 0.04 (0.01) ***
    Village dummy 2 3.72 (0.62) ***
Note - Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.  *: significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***: significant at 1%.
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Current household sectoral incomes
E(x) Agriculture Fishing Skilled extraction Unskilled extraction
GLS GLS Hetero. Tobit Slope Hetero. Tobit Slope
Land (ha) 3.4 253 (90.6) *** 0.005 (35.8) 167 (104) 43 -98 (34.8) *** -70
Land
2 (ha
2) 27 -8.4 (8.74) 0.62 (2.25) -10 (7.10) -2.6 6.0 (2.18) *** 4.3
Productive capital (100S/.) 7.9 9.2 (13.3) 50 (18.1) *** 115 (49.0) ** 30 8.7 (7.34) 6.3
Productive capital
2 (10
4S/.) 256 -0.074 (0.09) -1.3 (0.49) *** -2.6 (1.52) * -0.68 -0.06 (0.05) -0.05
Productive capital * Village dummy 2 1.5 69 (104)
Productive capital
2 * Village dummy 2 139 0.80 (0.83)
Non-producitve capital (100S/.) 7.2 14 (19.1) -1.6 (9.1) -45 (24.8) * -11.6 12.36 (8.37) 8.9
Non-producitve capital
2 (10
4S/.) 406 -0.17 (0.16) 0.00004 (0.07) 0.19 (0.18) 0.05 -0.082 (0.06) -0.06
Current extractive skills (0,.5,1=high) 0.07 777 (424) * 210 (270) 2468 (466) *** 639 384 (249) 277
No. male adults 1.9 254 (292) 131 (170) 444 (548) 115 -61 (163) -44
No. male adults
2 5.2 -64 (53.5) -10.3 (30.4) -139 (112) -36 8.5 (31.0) 6.2
No. female adults 1.7 68 (181) 129 (138) -358 (335) -93 107 (110) 77
No. female adults
2 4.3 14.4 (26.5) -11 (21.9) 47.1 (50.9) 12.2 -19 (16.8) -14
Kinship group size (household) 7.8 -51 (15.5) *** 8.3 (12.5) -48.9 (29.4) * -12.6 6.1 (9.19) 4.4
Age of household head (year) 44 53 (38.0) 21 (25.6) 188 (77.1) ** 49 21 (22.5) 15
Age of household head
2 2122 -0.40 (0.41) -0.27 (0.27) -2.4 (0.86) *** -0.63 -0.28 (0.24) -0.20
Village dummy 1 0.09 -408 (806) -257 (575) -4427 (1608) *** -1146 941 (522) * 679
Village dummy 2 0.07 -1229 (768) 3228 (1502) ** -4052 (1617) ** -1049 -430 (463) -310
Village dummy 3 0.11 -51 (795) -243 (566) -4659 (1670) *** -1206 71 (478) 51
Village dummy 4 0.26 -991 (793) -91 (572) -3989 (1571) ** -1032 19 (479) 14
Village dummy 5 0.25 -615 (801) 2084 (633) *** -4218 (1595) *** -1092 -216 (483) -156
Village dummy 6 0.09 -611 (832) -473 (590) -1784 (1633) -462 -179 (495) -129
Village dummy 7 0.05 -561 (803) -276 (559) -1801 (1589) -466 -201 (468) -145
Village dummy 8 0.09 246 (1038) -444 (560) -3505 (1629) ** -907 -235 (484) -169
  28(continued)
P-V normality test (t(185))
    Skewness 0.10 0.63
    Kurtosis 0.07 0.49
Wu exogeneity test (F(2,187))
    Land (ha) 0.09 0.22
    Productive capital (100S/.) 0.003 0.53
    Non-producitve capital (100S/.) 1.20 0.03
S-B exogeneity test (t(185))
    Land (ha) 0.45 0.10
    Productive capital (100S/.) 0.30 0.97
    Non-producitve capital (100S/.) 0.42 -0.22




(3)) 125 *** 247 ***
Tobit heteroskedasticity test (

(2)) 5.4 * 14.3 ***
Heteroskedastic form
    Constant 11.87 (0.22) *** 11.38 (0.21) *** 14.61 (65.0) *** 3.78 12.39 (0.26) *** 8.94
    Land (ha) 0.19 (0.04) ***
    Productive capital (100S/.) 0.001 (0.01)
    Current extractive skills (0,.5,1=high) -2.36 (2.66) *** -0.61
    No. male adults 0.15 (0.12) 0.109
    Village dummy 1 1.21 (0.38) *** 0.873
    Village dummy 2 3.93 (0.65) ***
    Village dummy 5 2.36 (0.38) ***
    Village dummy 6 0.30 (0.69) 0.078
    Village dummy 8 1.84 (0.59) ***
Note - Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.  *: significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***: significant at 1%.
Slopes (or margnial effects) are computed using mean value of all explanatory variables.
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